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In February 2002, we were sitting in a bar in Buea, the capital of the South
West Province of Anglophone Cameroon, watching the Cameroon-Mali
football semi-final in the African Cup of Nations that was being relayed in
Cameroon by a French television channel. The winner of the match was
to play Senegal, which had already qualified for the final by defeating Nig-
eria. What struck us most during the match was the sudden change in
attitude of our fellow viewers. Initially, they appeared to identify strongly
with the national team, as was manifest in their comments on the prowess
of Cameroon's "Indomitable Lions". However, as soon as the French com-
mentator noticed that, whatever the outcome of the match, "la finale sera
une affaire francophone", almost reflexively and in unison, they shouted:
"Cameroon is not a Francophone country!" Suddenly any identification with
the national team seemed to have disappeared. Even a later remark by the
commentator that one of the Cameroonian players was an Anglophone failed
to change the mood and restore their enjoyment of the match.
The reaction of the Anglophone spectators reminded us of Hobsbawm's
observation (1990: 143) that the "imagined communities of millions seem
more real than a team of eleven named people" and demonstrates the import-
ance of identity politics in Cameroon. It also makes for an interesting
comparison with the disengagement of the extreme nationalist leader Jean-
Marie Ie Pen from the French national team due to its multicultural charac-
ter: "Je ne me reconnais pas dans cette e'quipe." However, it clearly pro-
blematises Pardon's "football argument". With specific reference to the
widespread identification in Africa with national football teams, hè posits
the development of national feelings "in all states that have been indepen-
dent for more than thirty years... The annexation of a neighbouring state,
no matter how modest, would soon show the reality of "national" identities'
(Pardon 1996: 94). To a large extent, the Cameroonian Situation reflects
Cahen's thesis (1999) that African identification with national teams is sim-
ply an expression of the habit of living together in the same republic or, even
Cahiers d'Études africaines, XLIV (3), 175, 2004, pp. 609-633.
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better, of "constitutional patriotism" (Habermas) rather than of a strongly
crystallised national consciousness. The Imagination of a nation (B. Ander-
son 1983) usually requires a much longer historical process than Pardon is
willing to accept—a process that state policies can only reinforce but never
entirely determine. Cahen cautions that it would be an "erreur senghorienne "
to assume that the state would precede the nation, in the sense of "produc-
ing" or at least "preparing" the nation. In his view, the state can only serve
as a midwife for nationisme, the agenda of an ultra-minor elite to rapidly
"fabricate" the nation. This is a project that is different from nationalism
and opposed to existing ethnic and national identities (Cahen 1999: 153-
155). That the Cameroonian post-colonial state's nation-building project
has failed is clearly evidenced by the fact that nationalist feelings are still
rife in Anglophone territory more than forty years after reunification with
Francophone Cameroon.
This study argues that the entry of Anglophone nationalism into public
space during political liberalisation in the 1990s has posed a severe threat
to the post-colonial nation-building project. Several Anglophone associ-
ations and pressure groups emerged that have protested against Anglophone
marginalisation, assimilation and exploitation by the Francophone-domina-
ted state in the post-colonial state. They proved capable of placing the
"Anglophone problem" on the national and international agenda, laying
claims to self-determination and autonomy in the form first of a return to
the federal state and later the creation of an independent state.
Strikingly, both Francophone scholars and politicians have been inclined
to perceive Anglophone nationalism as an unexpected, recent invention
(Donfack 1998; Menthong 1998). They appear to have been convinced
that the post-colonial state's imposition of a project of nationisme upon the
existing ethnic and national identities had effectively wiped out most traces
of "Anglophoneness", or what Edwin Ardener (1967: 292) referred to as a
"distinctively British Cameroonian way of life", from the public space.
This is evidenced by a recent statement from the former vice-prime minister
in charge of Housing and Town Planning, Hamadou Mustapha: "Ä un moment
donné effectivement, on a commencé ä oublier que les Anglophones étaient
la; on a eu l'Impression que les Anglophones s'étaient déjafrancophonisés"1.
Francophone scholars and politicians also tend to attribute the emerg-
ence of Anglophone nationalism in the public space mainly to the mobilisa-
tion efforts of a few discontented elites who were denied a place at the
"dining table" during political liberalisation (Sindjoun 1995; Nkoum-Me-
Ntseny 1996; Menthong 1998). Their explanation in terms of opportunist
entrepreneurs in search of a political market comes close to the government
position on Anglophone nationalism. Probably on the assumption that gov-
ernment strategies of control, notably the frequent use of state violence,
divide-and-rule tactics, and the co-optation of some Anglophone elites into
1. See Jeune Afrique Economie, 207, 20 November 1995, p. 3.
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the regime, would be effective, they claim that Anglophone nationalism will
never witness an exponential growth in the public arena (Sindjoun 1995:
114).
In sharp contrast to such views, the first part of this study attempts to
show that Anglophone nationalism is neither a recent invention nor a mere
elitist project. It is instead the result of a long historical process of identity
formation, going back as far as the beginning of colonialism when two
territorial communities were created each with its own distinct cultural leg-
acy. As Susungi (1991) aptly observed, one of its immediate consequences
has been that the reunification episode was far from being the reunion of
two prodigal sons who had been unjustly separated at birth, but was more
like a loveless marriage arranged by the United Nations between two people
who hardly knew each other. The most decisive factor in the construction
of an Anglophone identity, however, has turned out to be the post-colonial
nation-state project that led Anglophones to imagine Cameroon as a prison
rather than as a nation.
The second part of the article describes how, in the face of persistent
attempts by the Francophone-dominated state to contain the Anglophone
danger and control Anglophone Organisation, Anglophones resorted to less
visible and controllable forms of protest in the 1990s, creating space for
Anglophone identity and nationhood in national history, the arts, the interna-
tional courts, in everyday life and even on the Internet. In this section,
particular attention is devoted to what Billig (1995) has called "banal nation-
alism" — the representations and symbols of nationhood that are taken for
granted such as flags, names, dates and language. The latter are often over-
looked in the orthodox conceptions of nationalism that tend to concentrate
on more spectacular forms such as separatist and extreme nationalist mov-
ements (Azaryahu & Kook 2002).
The Emergence of Anglophone Nationalism in Public Space
Several authors have tried to explain the emergence and development of
what has come to be called the "Anglophone problem" (Konings &
Nyamnjoh 1997, 2000, 2003; Eyoh 1998; Jua 2003). Most agree that its
roots may be traced back as far as the partitioning, after World War One,
of the erstwhile German Kamerun Protectorate (1884-1916) between the
French and English victors, first as mandates under the League of Nations
and later as trusts under the United Nations. As a result of this partitioning,
the British acquired two narrow and non-contiguous regions in the western
part of the country, bordering Nigeria. The southern part and the focus of
our study was christened Southern Cameroons, and the northern part became
known as Northern Cameroons2. Significantly, the British territory was
2. During the 1961 UN-organised plebiscite, the Northern Cameroons voted for Inte-
gration into Nigeria. For the history of the Northern Cameroons, see, for
instance, LE VINE (1964) and WELCH (1966).
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much smaller than the French one, comprising only about one fifth of the
total area and population of the former German colony (Mbuagbaw et al.
1987: 78-79). The partitioning of the territory into English and French
spheres had some significant consequences for future political develop-
ments. Importantly, it laid the historical and spatial foundation for the con-
struction of Anglophone and Francophone identities in the territory. The
populations in each sphere came to see themselves as distinct communities,
defined by differences in language and inherited colonial traditions of educa-
tion, law, public administration and worldview. Second, while French
Cameroon was incorporated into the French colonial empire as a distinct
administrative unit, separate from neighbouring French Equatorial Africa,
the British Cameroons was administered as part of Nigeria, leading to the
blatant neglect of its socio-economic development and the increasing migra-
tion of Nigerians, notably the Igbo, to the Southern Cameroons where they
came to dominate the regional economy.
With the approaching independence of Nigeria in 1960, the population
of the British trust territory was to decide on its political future. It soon
became evident that the majority of the Southern Cameroonians would opt
for the creation of an independent state (Awasom 2000; Konings &
Nyamnjoh 2003). That their expressed wish was eventually not honoured
must be attributed to two main factors. First, internal divisions among the
Anglophone political elite prevented them from rallying behind the majority
option in the territory. Second, and even more importantly, the United
Nations refused, with the complicity of the British, to put the option of an
independent Southern Cameroons state to the voters in the UN-organised
plebiscite of 11 February 1961, on the grounds that the creation of another
tiny state was politically undesirable (and likely to contribute to a further
"Balkanisation" of Africa) and economically unviable (Konings &
Nyamnjoh 2003). Being deprived of this preferred option, Southern
Cameroonians were given what amounted to Hobson's choice, that is a
"choice" they had to accept whether they liked it or not: independence by
joining Nigeria or reunification with Francophone Cameroon, which had
become independent in 1960 under the new name of the Republic of
Cameroon. In the end, they chose the lesser of the two evils. Their vote
in favour of reunification appeared to be more a rejection of continuous
ties with Nigeria, which had proved to be harmful to Southern Cameroonian
development, than a vote for union with Francophone Cameroon, a territory
with a different cultural heritage and at the time involved in a violent civil
war (Joseph 1977).
By reuniting with the former French Cameroon, the Anglophone politi-
cal elite had hoped to enter into a loose federal union as a way of protecting
their territory's minority status and cultural heritage (Konings & Nyamnjoh
1997, 2003). Instead, it soon became evident that the Francophone political
elite preferred a highly centralised, unitary state as a means of promoting
national unity and economie development. While the Francophone elite
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received strong support from the French during the constitutional negotia-
tions, the Anglophone elite was virtually abandoned by the British, who
deeply resented the Southern Cameroons option for reunification with Fran-
cophone Cameroon (Awasom 2000). As a result, a rumour quickly spread
through the region that Charles de Gaulle looked upon the Southern
Cameroons as "a small gift of the Queen of England to France" (Milne
1999: 432-448; Gaillard 1994). In the end, during the constitutional talks
at Foumban in July 1961, the Francophone elite was only prepared to accept
a highly centralised federation, which was regarded merely as a transitional
phase to a unitary state. Such a federation demanded relatively few amend-
ments to the 1960 constitution of the Republic of Cameroon. Interestingly,
Pierre Messmer (1998: 134-135), one of the last French high commissioners
in Cameroon and a close advisor of President Ahmadou Ahidjo, pointed
out that hè and others knew at the time that the so-called federal constitution
provided merely a "sham federation", which was "safe for appearance, an
annexation of West Cameroon (the new name of the former Southern
Cameroons)"3.
Under the new constitution, West Cameroon lost most of the limited
autonomy it had enjoyed as part of the Nigerian federation (Ardener 1967;
Stark 1976). Even worse, a few months after reunification, Ahidjo created
a system of regional administration in which West Cameroon was desig-
nated as one of six regions, basically ignoring the political character of the
country. These regions were headed by powerful federal inspectors who,
in the case of West Cameroon, in effect overshadowed the prime minister
with whom they were in frequent conflict concerning jurisdiction (Stark
1976). Besides, the West Cameroon government could barely function
since it had to depend entirely on subventions from the federal government
that controlled the major sources of revenue. When, in 1972, Ahidjo crea-
ted a unitary state in blatant disregard of constitutional provisions, there
was in reality little left of the federation, except perhaps in name (Benjamin
1972). What many regarded as one of the last visible symbols of the 1961
union was removed in 1984 when Ahidjo's successor, Paul Biya, abolished
the appellation "United Republic of Cameroon" and replaced it with
"Republic of Cameroon", which significantly was the name of the Franco-
phone part of the country when it became independent in 1960.
An even more decisive factor for the development of the Anglophone
problem, however, was the nation-state project after reunification. For the
Anglophone population, nation-building has been driven by the firm deter-
mination of the Francophone political elite to dominate the Anglophone
minority in the post-colonial state and to erase the cultural and institutional
foundations of Anglophone identity (Eyoh 1998). Several studies have
3. Following reunification, the Federal Republic of Cameroon consisted of the fed-
erated state of East Cameroon (former French Cameroon) and the federated state
of West Cameroon (former Southern Cameroons).
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shown that Anglophones have regularly been relegated to inferior positions
in the national decision-making process and have been constantly underrep-
resented in ministerial as well as senior- and middle-level positions in the
administration, the military and parastatals (Kofele-Kale 1986; Takougang
& Krieger 1998). A few recent examples seem to substantiate Anglophone
allegations of systematic discrimination in the recruitment for government
posts. In February 2003 it was announced that there were only 57 Anglo-
phone youths among the more than five thousand new recruits joining the
police academies4. The next month records show that there were only
12 Anglophones among the 172 new recruits into the Customs Department.
And, even more significantly, these Anglophones were only given junior
staff positions while all the senior staff positions went to Francophones5.
There is also general agreement that Anglophones have been exposed to a
carefully considered policy aimed at eroding their language and institutions
even though Francophone political leaders had assured their Anglophone
counterparts during the constitutional talks on reunification that the inherited
colonial differences in language and institutions were to be respected in the
bilingual union. And, last but not least, the relative underdevelopment of
the Anglophone region shows that it has not benefited sufficiently from
its rieh resources, particularly oil. Gradually, this created an Anglophone
consciousness: the feeling of being recolonised and marginalised in all
spheres of public life and thus of being second-class citizens in their own
country.
While there is a general tendency among Anglophones to blame the
Francophone elite for the entire Anglophone problem, it cannot be denied
that Anglophone political leaders bear an important share of the responsibil-
ity for the Anglophone predicament. Apparently, when they realised that
their influence within the federated state of West Cameroon was beginning
to be whittled down, the federal arrangements no longer suited their
designs. They starled competing for Ahidjo's favours and aspiring to posi-
tions of power within the single party and the federal government and even-
tually within the unitary state, thus blatantly neglecting the defence of West
Cameroon's autonomy and interests (Kofele-Kale 1986; Eyoh 1998).
The co-optation of the Anglophone elite into the "hegemonie alliance"
(Bayart 1979) and the autocratie nature of the post-colonial regimes pre-
vented Anglophones from openly organising in defence of their interests
until the political liberalisation process in the early 1990s. The newly crea-
ted Anglophone movements were then able to place the Anglophone prob-
lem on the national and international agenda6. While the Buea Declaration,
issued after the historie First All Anglophone Conference (AAC i) in April
4. The Herald, 17 February 2003.
5. The Herald, 22 March 2003.
6. For the various Anglophone movements, see KONINGS & NYAMNJOH (2003).
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1993, still called for a return to a two-state federation, the Biya gov-
ernment's persistent refusal to enter into any negotiations caused a growing
radicalisation of Anglophone movements. In the so-called Bamenda Procla-
mation, adopted by the Second All Anglophone Conference (AAC n) held
in Bamenda from 29 April to l May 1994, it was stipulated that "should
the government either persist in its refusal to engage in meaningful constitu-
tional talks or fail to engage in such talks within a reasonable time, the
Anglophone leadership would proclaim the revival of the independence and
sovereignty of the Anglophone territory and take all measures necessary to
secure, defend and preserve the independence, sovereignty and integrity of
the said country" (Konings & Nyamnjoh 1997: 218-220).
Following the AAC n, the Anglophone movements provocatively re-intro-
duced the name of Southern Cameroons to refer to the Anglophone territory
so as to "make it clear that our struggles are neither of an essentially linguis-
tic character nor in defence of an allen colonial culture... but are aimed at
the restoration of the autonomy of the former Southern Cameroons which
has been annexed by the Republic of Cameroon"7. The umbrella Organisa-
tion of all the Anglophone movements was subsequently named the South-
ern Cameroons National Council (SCNC). The SCNC leadership soon adopted
a secessionist stand, striving for an independent Southern Cameroons state
through peaceful negotiation with the regime, the "sensitisation" of the
regional population and a diplomatic offensive. Widespread euphoria could
be feit in Anglophone Cameroon when a SCNC delegation returned from a
mission to the United Nations in 1995. During rallies attended by huge
crowds in several Anglophone towns, the delegation displayed a large UN
flag, claiming it had received it from the UN to show that the Southern
Cameroons was still a UN trust territory and that independence was only a
matter of time8.
From 1996 onwards, however, Anglophone movements appeared to rapi-
dly lose their initial momentum. Two factors were mainly responsible for
this unfortunate development. First, the Biya government proved capable
of neutralising the Anglophone movements to a large extent by employing
a number of long-standing tactics including divide-and-rule, co-opting Ang-
lophone leaders into the regime, and severe repression. Second, there was
the problem of leadership. With the resignation of the founding fathers
from the leadership, the SCNC lacked competent and committed leadership.
7. SCNC press release reprinted in the Cameroon Post, 16-23 August 1994, p. 3.
8. The SCNC leaders alleged (i) that the proper procedures for the enactment and
amendment of the federal constitution had not been followed by Ahidjo; and
(ii) that Francophone Cameroon had seceded from the union in 1984 when the
Biya government unilaterally changed the country's name from the United
Republic of Cameroon to the Republic of Cameroon — the name of independent
Francophone Cameroon prior to reunification. From this perspective, they often
claimed that the Trust Territory of Southern Cameroons had never really ceased
to exist or had been revived. They therefore still believed in continued UN
responsibility for the Southern Cameroons. See KONINGS & NYAMNJOH (2003).
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Given the leadership problem and the government's persistent reluctance to
enter into any negotiations, a conflict developed within the Anglophone
movements between the doves—those who continued to adhere to a nego-
tiated Separation from La République du Cameroun9—and the hawks—those
who had come to the conclusion that the independence of Southern
Cameroons would only be achieved through armed struggle. The Southern
Cameroons Youth League (SCYL) in particular opted for the latter strategy
(Konings & Nyamnjoh 2000).
However, it would be a grave error to assume that the Anglophone mov-
ements became fully paralysed or even defeated by divisive and repressive
government tactics and their own organisational and strategie shortcom-
ings. Of late, Anglophone struggles appear to have acquired a new impe-
tus. On 30 December 1999, Justice Frederick Alobwede Ebong, a SCNC
activist with close ties to the SCYL, took over the Cameroon Radio and
Television (CRTV) station in Buea, proclaiming the restoration of the inde-
pendence of the Ex-British Southern Cameroons. This was followed by
the nomination of a provisional government and the announcement of a coat
of arms, a flag and a national anthem (Konings & Nyamnjoh 2003).
Significantly, owing to these and previous events, an increasing number
of pro-government Anglophone and Francophone elite now acknowledge,
after long years of public denial, that there is indeed an Anglophone prob-
lem. In January 1999, President Paul Biya for the first time admitted, albeit
in a dismissive fashion, that such a problem existed, even if hè perceived
it as one created by a handful of hotheads and vandals. Still, he has not
yet shown any interest in negotiating with Anglophone movements in spite
of regulär appeals by Anglophone, Francophone and international dignitaries
to solve the Anglophone problem through dialogue10.
Faced with determined attempts by the Biya government to control Ang-
lophone organisations and deconstruct the Anglophone identity, Anglophone
nationalists have increasingly adopted less visible and less controllable strat-
egies to place the Anglophone problem in the public space.
Bringing Back Anglophone Identity into Historical Space
The regime and organic scholars (Ahidjo 1968; Forje 1981; Fogui 1990)
have often attempted to historicise Cameroon only in terms of its present
9. Reference to the incumbent regime as the government of La République du
Cameroun, the name adopted by Francophone Cameroon at independence, has
become a key signifier in the replotting of the country's constitutional history as
a progressive consolidation of the recolonisation and annexation of Anglophone
Cameroon by the post-colonial Francophone-dominated state. See EYOH (1998:
264).
10. For example, during nis visit to Cameroon in May 2000, the UN Secretary-General
Kofi Annan pleaded for dialogue between the Anglophone and Francophone
leaders.
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mobilisation needs, in particular the construction of a national consciousness
as part of the nation-building project11. They are, therefore, engaged in an
impressive dose of historical amnesia—willed acts of selective remembrance
of the past so as to erase Anglophone identity and heritage from national
history. Anglophone nationalist leaders and scholars, in turn, have quickly
recognised the importance of rediscovering Anglophone history as an
invaluable political resource in combating the regime and raising the con-
sciousness of the Anglophone population. They have therefore attempted
to bring back Anglophone identity into the historical space, strongly contest-
ing some of the myths created by the regime and organic scholars. We
have only room here for a few examples.
One myth is that "Cameroon has always been one and no more"12. In
creating this myth, the regime and organic scholars attempt to dismiss the
role of the colonial state in "inventing" Cameroon itself and in creating two
distinct communities on Cameroonian territory. Unlike Ardener (1967),
they are arguing that Cameroon was already in existence before colonial
rule and that colonialism only fostered a rupture in the pre-colonial convivi-
ality and cordiality traditions that were "determining ancestral values". Conse-
quently, Anglophones should "transcend historical barriers" and return to
the original Situation in which all people in Cameroon lived together ami-
cably and peacefully (Nkoum-Me-Ntseny 1996). Anglophone nationalists
have instead constantly argued that the colonial state was far more important
than the (largely mythical) pre-colonial state in mapping out the historical
trajectory of the post-colonial state (Konings & Nyamnjoh 2003).
A second myth is that reunification signified a long-awaited reunion of
people separated for many years by arbitrarily imposed colonial borders and
thus was warm-heartedly and freely embraced by both parties (Donfack
1998: 35). Anglophone nationalists have instead provided sufficient evi-
dence that the people in both territories were reluctant to reunite. Not only
had the two communities gone through two completely different colonial
experiences prior to reunification but they had also lived longer apart than
together in a body politie. The idea of reunification, which had been mainly
'propagated by the radical nationalist party in Francophone Cameroon, the
Union des populations du Cameroun (UPC), and Francophone immigrants
11. MONGA (1996: 89) noted that the Council of Higher Education and the National
Council on Cultural Affairs in Cameroon stipulated that the role of the intellectual
was to contribute in a concrete way to the formation of a national consciousness.
12. This claim was once again made by the Minister of Defence, Ahmadou Ali, in
his address to the National Assembly in April 2000. See The Herold, l April
2000, p. 3. Recently, a renowned Cameroonian political scientist and member
of cabinet, Elvis Ngolle Ngolle, argued in The Post (22 January 2001) that
"Cameroon came into existence before the colonial master split us into two.
Thank God, in 1961, we came together again because what God has put together,
man was not supposed to put asunder". Though the concepts of nation and state
are confounded in this argument, it has good political purchase among those who
argue that Cameroon predated the colonial state.
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in Anglophone Cameroon (Joseph 1977; Awasom 2000), had for a long
time remained a mere slogan in Anglophone Cameroon and had simply
been rejected by the French colonial administration and the majority of the
Francophone political elite. Many Anglophones did eventually vote for
reunification but only after they had been forced by external forces to aban-
don their preferred option of creating an independent state. The idea of
unification was not debated in Francophone governmental circles until Feb-
ruary 1958 when the French High Commissioner, Jean Ramadier, assured
Alcam, the territory's parliament, of "independence as well as the union of
the two Cameroons"—most probably a tactical strategy to appropriate the
cherished slogans of the UPC rebels and deprive them of their ideological
platform. His caution that these issues feil within the reserved competence
of the French government was superfluous because Anglophone Cameroon
was terra incognita to the parliamentarians. Even when Ahmadou Ahidjo
replaced André-Marie Mbida as prime minister in the course of that year,
reunification was still seen as "un ajout du haut commissaire" (Gaillard
1994: 84-89). Even on the eve of the UN-organised plebiscite in Anglo-
phone Cameroon in February 1961, reunification remained low on Ahidjo's
list of political preferences which, according to a United States intelligence
report, were as follows: (i) to lose in both the Southern and Northern
Cameroons; (ii) to win in the Northern Cameroons where his ethnic and
religious brothers, the Fulbe Muslims, were in power, and to lose in the
Southern Cameroons ruled by an elite with close ethnic ties to his opponents
in the southwestern part of Francophone Cameroon; (iii) to win in both
regions; or (iv) to win in the Southern Cameroons and lose in the Northern
Cameroons13. This shows that Ahidjo, whose power position was still weak
in Francophone Cameroon in the time preceding reunification, was more
concerned with reinforcing his electoral base than with reunification per se
(Awasom 2000; Konings & Nyamnjoh 2003). He did not want to upset
the current Situation and thereby cause a shift in power relations.
A third myth is that the 1961 Foumban Conference was a historie event
where estranged brothers mutually agreed upon a federal constitution for a
reunified Cameroon. However, for Anglophone nationalists, the conference
was an occasion where the Francophone majority used its superior bargain-
ing strength to control negotiations and enforce a form of federation far
below Anglophone expectations. Lack of respect by Francophones for even
the minimal "consensus" arrived at in Foumban has been traumatic for Ang-
lophones and has come to play an essential role in their collective identity
and psychopathology.
A fourth myth is that the unitary state was the outcome of the massive
vote by the Cameroonian people as voluntarily expressed in the 1972 refer-
endum. Anglophone nationalists have instead pointed out that, given grow-
ing Anglophone disillusionment with the union, the referendum results were
13. us State Department, Intelligence Report, 8423, 10 March 1961.
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more likely a manifestation of the regime's autocratie nature than of the
Anglophone population's support. In other words, fear prevented Anglo-
phones from expressing their objective interests. The ballot box was far
from secret, election results were fixed beforehand, and it was neither politi-
cally wise nor politically safe to hold and express views different from those
of the president, let alone oppose in word or deed any of his plans or
actions. In 1991, Solomon Tandeng Muna, who was prime minister of the
federated state of West Cameroon and vice-president of the federal republic
at the time of the referendum, admitted in a radio interview that hè had
not dared to reveal to Ahidjo the true feelings of Anglophones about the
referendum because it would have been tantamount to signing his own death
warrant (Boh & Ofege 1991: 16).
Strikingly, Anglophone nationalists have also been deeply concerned
with naming and the removal of historical documents by the government.
Although such issues may initially appear somewhat "banal", they turn out
to be closely connected with the symbolic construction and preservation of
Anglophone identity and heritage.
Anglophone nationalists refuse to recognise the government's designa-
tion of 20 May, the date of the inauguration of the unitary state in 1972,
as the country's National Day. Since the early 1990s, they have continued
to boycott celebrations, declaring it a "Day of Mourning" and a "Day of
Shame". They also indict the regime for declaring 11 February, the day
of the 1961 plebiscite, as Youth Day. They see the persistent failure of the
government to highlight the historical significance of this day as a conscious
attempt to reconfigure the nation's history. They have thus called upon
the Anglophone population to mark 11 February as the "Day of the Plebi-
scite" and l October as the "Day of Independence" as alternative days of
national celebration. On these days, Anglophone activists have frequently
attempted to hoist the federation, the United Nations or independent South-
ern Cameroons flags—attempts that were often brutally challenged by the
security forces.
Anglophones have also continuously resisted government attempts to
change the historical names of localities in their territory. They have par-
ticularly opposed the change of name of Victoria, a coastal town named
after Queen Victoria (Courade 1976), into Limbe, the name of a river that
flows through the town. This renaming of localities in Anglophone
Cameroon has often been presented as a government attempt to promote
what Mobutu has referred to in Zaire as "authenticité". Government failure
to implement a similar policy in Francophone Cameroon is clear proof that
its avowed goal was to erase the Anglophone identity and history14. Anglo-
phone nationalists have re-introduced the name of Victoria during political
liberalisation. Even Anglophones who tend to support the government's
14. It is quite revealing that memories of French colonisation are carefully preserved,
manifest in names like Avenue General de Gaulle in Douala.
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project of nationisme seem to be ambivalent in their attitude towards renam-
ing. While they usually attempt to erase the name Victoria from the public
space, they sometimes appear to align with the "subversives" by respecting
the name of the local football club, Victoria United, and maintaining the
name of their own local college network, the Victoria Old Boys' Associ-
ation (VOBA).Whatever the motivation, the removal of certain documents by the cen-
tral government from the archives in Buea was also seen by Anglophones
as an attempt to erase the institutional memory of Anglophone Cameroon.
Anglophone perception was strengthened by the belief that the archives were
a repository for documents that could give the regional population an insight
into what really transpired before, during and after the Foumban Confer-
ence. It was even rumoured that one of these documents envisaged
secession should Anglophones be discontent with the outcome of the confer-
ence after a stipulated period of time. Remarkably, in the wake of the
death in 1999 of John Ngu Foncha, the Anglophone architect of reunifica-
tion, another rumour rapidly spread in Anglophone Cameroon that this par-
ticular document, almost the holy grail of Anglophone nationalism, which
the government wanted to remove from the Buea archives, had actually
been in the custody of Foncha after reunification. He was said to have
handed it over to Augustine Ngom Jua, his successor as prime minister in
1965. Following Jua's dismissal in 1967, it would have been recovered
from his office, sealed, and returned to Foncha who had hidden it in a
relative's grave in the Mankon Catholic cemetery in Bamenda. Ambassador
(retired) Henry Fossung, a leader of one of the SCNC factions, claimed that
Foncha had given it to him shortly before his death. Arguably, this is a
variant of "grave digging" by a leader in quest of legitimacy. However,
it acquires some respectability when it is placed in the perspective of a
deep Anglophone concern with its past and identity.
Creating Space for Anglophone Identity in Arts
Art forms, as Karin Barber (1987: 4) has observed, "do not merely reflect
an already constituted consciousness, giving us a window to something
already fully present, they are themselves important means through which
consciousness is articulated and communicated". Confronted with severe
state repression, Anglophone nationalists have resorted to the arts to create
public space for the Anglophone problem and raise Anglophone conscious-
ness and action. In this section, we focus on Anglophone dramatists and
performers who have played a major role in this respect (Lyonga et al.
1993; Ako 2001).
Among the growing number of Anglophone playwrights15, two in par-
ticular have identified with the Anglophone struggles: Bate Besong and Epie
15. For a discussion of the role of Anglophone writers and dramatists in the post-
reunification Cameroonian literature, see, for instance, LYONGA et al. (1993).
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Ngome. Bate Besong, Anglophone Cameroon's most versatile and charis-
matic playwright and poet, has always maintained that the Anglophone cre-
ative writer "must arouse his Anglophone constituency from the apathy and
despair into which it has 'sunk' and transform his writing into 'hand gre-
nades' to be used against Francophone oppressors" (Ngwane 1993: 35).
A cursory overview of his own writing leaves one in no doubt that Bate
Besong has lived up to his own prescriptions. His Beasts of No Nation
(1990) is a bitter indictment of the Francophone exploitation of the Anglo-
phones who are reduced to "night soilmen" (a metaphor for slavery).
Throughout the play, the Francophones are presented as reckless destroyers
of the nation because of their unbridled appetites and moral insensitivity.
They are "ravenous wolves" or "roaring lions" seeking to devour all that
crosses their path. They are "locusts" who "eat tons of green". They are
"thieves of no nation" who belong to a secret cult of "greed, grab and
graft". The exploited "Anglos", however, are going to demand their füll
civil rights or, what the dramatist calls, their "identification papers". The
narrator, a kind of priest who will lead the down-trodden Anglos to the
New Jerusalem, makes it clear that they will have their freedom—perhaps
a nation of their own—or death. And the leitmotiv that runs through the
play is: "A hero goes to war to die" (Ako 2001).
For his part, Epie Ngome in What God Has Put Asunder (1992) uses
an extended marriage metaphor to denounce the union between Anglophone
and Francophone Cameroon and the unitary state. It is the story of Weka,
a child brought up in an orphanage run by Reverend Gordon and Sister
Sabeth. When Weka reaches marriageable age, two suitors ask for her hand
in marriage. One is Miché Garba and the other Emeka, who grew up in
the orphanage with Weka. Despite Emeka's solid claims over Weka as a
childhood friend, Garba has his way although Weka accepts him reluctan-
tly. Weka soon discovers that Garba is no good: hè maltreats and neglects
her and cannot tolerate her questioning attitude. He exploits the rieh cocoa
farms lef t by her father and squanders the money on his concubines. When
she can stand him no longer, Weka escapes with her children to her father' s
compound to rebuild his dilapidated house and their shattered lives. Garba
pursues her there, threatening to forcefully take them back to his house.
Clearly, the marriage metaphor relates to the political union between
Anglophone Cameroon and its Francophone counterpart, with Weka stand-
ing for the former West Cameroon, Emeka for Nigeria, and Garba for La
République du Cameroun. Weka's parents represent the British government
that relinquished responsibility over the Southern Cameroons. Reverend
Gordon and the orphanage stand for the United Nations trusteeship mandate
over Southern Cameroons. Garba's neglectful but exploitative attitude
towards Weka represents the attitude of the Francophone leadership towards
Anglophone Cameroon, behaviour that has come to represent the central
grievance in what Anglophones have identified as the Anglophone problem
in Cameroon (Ambanasom 1996: 218-222). The major suffering inflicted
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by Miché Garba on Weka symbolises the creation of the unitary state in
1972:
"Once the festivities were over, hè brought a fleet of trucks and bundled all my
children and me out of our house. His drivers gathered all our staff trampling and
damaging many things and so he forced me to settle in with him. Since then, hè
has been forcing my children to learn his own mother longue and to forget mine
with which they grew up; I must abide by the customs of his clan, not mine, and...in
short hè has simply been breathing down my neck since then" (Ngome 1992: 53).
Both playwrights have contributed in no small way to the overall educa-
tion of Anglophones, which will only be achieved, as Bate Besong high-
lights in his Requiem for the Last Kaiser (1991), when Anglophones "will
break the chains that hold them in bondage" and "choose the side of the
long suffering people of Agidigi (Anglophone Cameroon)".
Anglophone plays by these and other writers have been made accessible
to ordinary Cameroonians by various theatre groups including the Yaoundé
Theater Troupe and the Flame Players (Doho 1996). They have not only
played in Yaoundé and other Francophone towns, but have also toured both
Anglophone provinces and some groups have even performed in Europe.
Plays staged by the Mountain Mourners in Germany have contributed inord-
inately to bringing the Anglophone plight to international attention.
Placing Anglophone Identity in Virtual Space
Following politica! liberalisation, the Anglophone private press served for
some time as the Standard bearer of Anglophone nationalism (Konings &
Nyamnjoh 2000). Unsurprisingly, the government quickly sought to
muzzle it as part of its strategy to erase Anglophone identity from public
space. In reaction, "new creoles" have emerged among Anglophone nation-
alists—men who have access to virtual space, enabling them to contest the
state's power of policing speech (J. Anderson 1995). The Anglophone
youth in the diaspora, notably in the United States, have underscored the
importance of the Internet. The scNC-North America (NA) has actually
played a vanguard role in creating websites on the Internet16. The name
of the main site was changed17 in July 2001 as "part of its ongoing strategy
to unite the forces of Southern Cameroons' liberation in the diaspora and
on the home front", providing them as well as visitors with "a one-stop-
source to learn and update themselves about Southern Cameroons, one of
the only African countries still under colonialism and seeking for ways to
effect its independence"18. It is considered to be the largest Cameroonian
16. http://www.southerncameroons.org or scncforum@yahoo.groups.com.
17. It was changed to http://www.yahoo.groups.com/group/BSCNation.
18. Cited in http://www.yahoo.groups.com/group/BSCNation/messages/ 975 and 5977.
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site, receiving, at its peak, more than 500 hits a day. It registered more
than 700 members in its first month of existence19.
Since its members were regularly engaged in ideological and strategie
warfare, the management of the site decided to introducé gate keeping, seek-
ing to oriënt discussions towards the achievement of the independence of
Southern Cameroons. To this end, it became more and more preoccupied
with fostering political correctness, going to the extent of "unsubscribing"
members with alternative views.
The site's new policy is to raise Anglophone consciousness and to pro-
mote the visibility of the Anglophone cause inside and outside Cameroon.
One of its most successful activities has been the posting of declassified
documents from the British archives, which provide ample evidence of the
alleged British betrayal of the Southern Cameroons in the pre-reunification
era. It aimed to make the Cameroonian and British people aware of the
refusal of the British government to protect Southern Cameroonian interests
against the Ahidjo regime supported by the French and to solicit their sup-
port for the renewed struggle for the independence of Southern Cameroons.
Interestingly, the raising of consciousness is often combined with
action. For example, the site reported extensively on what happened during
and after the scNC-organised celebrations of "Independence Day" on l Octo-
ber 2001, thus frustrating the government's attempts to control information
to the outside world and cover up certain activities. Despite government
orders banning all demonstrations throughout the Anglophone region, a con-
siderable number of SCNC activists decided to march in the North West
Province of Anglophone Cameroon on that day, defying the massive police
and army presence. At Kumbo, five peaceful demonstrators were killed
and many more were injured. Over 200 SCNC activists were arrested in
Bamenda and elsewhere, including the new SCNC leaders. Significantly,
when Anglophone magistrates eventually ordered the release of the detai-
nees, court orders were flouted by the regime. The sscNation site sent this
information to other websites as a form of e-protest. Pressure for the
release of the detainees was reinforced by its management's Organisation
of a protest march on the Cameroon Embassy in Washington. This combi-
nation of virtual and real modes of protest eventually caused the Cameroon-
ian government to release the activists.
Another example of cooperation between the site management and the
SCYL in May 2002 was a spectacular action called "Operation Stamp Your
Identity". Eighteen thousand bumper stickers calling for the creation of a
federal republic in Anglophone Cameroon were printed in the United States
and sent to Anglophone Cameroon. They were symbolically flagged in
Anglophone towns on 20 May 2002, the day that Cameroon celebrated its
30th anniversary of the unitary state.
19. Interview with the moderator on 23 May 2002.
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These examples show how cooperation between the new creoles and
activists has proved to be successful in advancing the Anglophone cause
and raising the consciousness of the national and international Community.
Expansion of Anglophone Identity into Legal Space
Anglophone nationalism still lacks international recognition. This has pre-
vented Anglophone nationalists from presenting their case before interna-
tional courts. Several attempts to sue Britain in British courts for its
"treacherous" role during the decolonisation process have been to no avail.
However, the decision of the Nigerian and Cameroonian governments to
submit their dispute over the oil-rich peninsula of Bakassi to the Interna-
tional Court of Justice (ici) in The Hague for adjudication in 1994 offered
Anglophone nationalists an opportunity to access legal space (Weiss 1996).
They claimed that Bakassi was neither a part of Cameroon nor of Nigeria
but instead belonged to the Southern Cameroons.
In 2001, the Ex-British Southern Cameroons Provisional Administration
created a new body, the Southern Cameroons People's Organisation (SCAPO),
for the specific purpose of pursuing legal avenues to address "the claims
of the peoples of Southern Cameroons to self-determination and indepen-
dence from La République du Cameroun". SCAPO, led by the SCNC chairman
and chancellor of the provisional administration Dr Martin Luma, and
Dr Kevin Gumne, rapidly filed a lawsuit against the Nigerian government
in the Federal High Court in Abuja "for the purpose of obtaining judicial
relief to restrain the government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria from
treating or continuing to treat or regard the Southern Cameroons or the
people of that territory as an integral part of La République du Came-
roun"
20
. SCAPO had two reasons for taking Nigeria to court in its legal
battles for the recognition of an independent Southern Cameroons state.
First, the trust territory of Southern Cameroons had been administered by
Britain as an integral part of Nigeria. Consequently, SCAPO was inclined
to regard Nigeria as a co-conspirator with Britain in the process that led to
the annexation of the Southern Cameroons by La République du Cameroun.
Second, Nigeria had ratified the OAU Banjul Charter of Human Rights that
lays down in Article 20 the right of all colonised or oppressed people to
free themselves from the bonds of domination by resorting to any means
recognised by the international community.
In the end, SCAPO scored a landmark victory when, in March 2002, the
Nigerian Federal High Court ruled that "the Federal Republic of Nigeria
shall be compelled to place before the IGJ and the UN General Assembly
and ensure diligent persecution to the conclusion the claims of the peoples
20. Cited in http://yahoo.groups.com/group/BSCNation/message/6830.
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of Southern Cameroons to self-determination and their declaration of inde-
pendence". It also placed a perpetual injunction, restraining "the govern-
ment of the Federal Republic of Nigeria from treating the Southern
Cameroons and all the peoples of the territory as an integral part of La
République du Cameroun"21.
This ruling may pave the way for international recognition of the Anglo-
phone struggle for the creation of an independent state. Yet, it cannot be
overlooked that Nigeria had an interest in the court's ruling if one takes
into account the ongoing hearings in the Bakassi case at the ia. This was
clearly recognised by the Nigerian Federal High Court when it ordered the
Nigerian government to submit to the ia the question of whether it is the
Southern Cameroons and not La République du Cameroun that ought to
share a maritime boundary with the Federal Republic of Nigeria?
Experiencing Anglophone Identity in Everyday Space
Anglophones are daily reminded of their national identity and homeland in
language, in individual and collective experiences, and in Stereotyping.
They tend to perceive themselves as different from Francophones and are
equally categorised and treated as "others" by Francophones, manifest
already in the constant use of "we" and "they" in everyday speech for
designating or delineating each other's homeland (Billig 1995: 93-95).
Undoubtedly, feelings of being different tend to raise the individual and
collective consciousness of Anglophones in everyday space and to create
open or secret support for Anglophone movements.
Given the widespread belief in the country that Anglophones have
become the greatest danger to the regime's nation-building project and even
to the regime itself during political liberalisation, it is not surprising that
the Francophone political elites are inclined to exclude them from the home-
land and incite the Francophone population against them. The Lord Mayor
of Yaoundé, Emah Basile, referred to Anglophones as "enemies in the
house". As such, they should either voluntarily "go across our borders" as
Mbombo Njoya, the former minister of territorial administration and present
Sultan of Foumban, once remarked or be chased away (Ngniman 1993:
51). Francophones tend to refer to Anglophones as "Anglo-fools", Biafrans
or Nigerians. By using the term Biafran, they are expressing their strong
belief that Anglophones are inclined to be secessionists. By using the term
Nigerian, they point to the colonial link between the Southern Cameroons
and Nigeria. We recently heard the story that when told by a visitor that
hè hailed from Kumba, the economie capital of the South West Province in
Anglophone Cameroon, the Cameroonian Ambassador to Belgium, Isabelle
21. West Africa, 31 March 2002, p. 19.
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Bassong, exclaimed: "Oh, Kumba, donc vous êtes moitié Nigerien et moitié
Camerounais."
Even Anglophones who speak impeccable French and have lived in
Francophone Cameroon for a long time are constantly reminded of the fact
that they are different. A young, well-educated Anglophone woman inter-
viewed by Eyoh (1998: 263) expressed her frustration with the Situation
as follows:
"No matter how bilingual you are, if you enter an office and demand something
in French, because of your accent, the messenger may announce your arrival simply
as 'une Anglo' or respond in a manner to mock. You know that stereotypes are
a normal part of life in Cameroon and the world over. But the constant reminder
that as an Anglophone you are different creates the Impression that we are second-
class citizens. That is what irritates Anglophone elites. You can imagine the frus-
tration of older and less educated Anglophones who have to deal with a bureaucracy
which operates mostly in French and state officials who are so rüde to the people
they are supposed to serve."
In a column of a well-known Cameroonian paper, Le Messager, a French
journalist reports the experience of a young Anglophone who had just retur-
ned to Cameroon after a five-year stay in South Africa and was made to
feel like a stranger in his own so-called bilingual country. When hè came
to pay in a large bakery in Douala, he received a cool reception from one
of the Francophone cashiers: "What do you want? Stop speaking English.
We don't speak that language here. Return to where you come from, John
Fru Ndi"22.
Anglophone identity and consciousness are raised by almost daily con-
frontations with overbearing Francophone government officials and oppres-
sive Francophone gendarmes and structures both in the Francophone region
and in their own region. Francophone prefects and sub-prefects posted in
Anglophone Cameroon often do not speak a word of English and tend to
behave like chefs de terre or part of commandement (Mbembe 2001: 106-
117), relegating, just as in the colonial era, the Anglophone population to
the position of subjects rather than citizens (Mamdani 1996). Moreover,
Anglophone "subversives" are regularly tried in Francophone rather than in
Anglophone courts and are subjected to different treatment in Francophone
cells than Francophone prisoners. Following a conflict over a love affair
between a villager and a Francophone gendarme officer in the North West
Province of Anglophone Cameroon, hè and several other villagers were
arrested by gendarmes and subsequently charged with being SCNC activists.
In clear violation of Cameroon's Penal Code, they were neither imprisoned
on Anglophone territory where the arrests had taken place nor tried under
22. John Fru Ndi is the charismatic Anglophone founder and chairman of the largest
Opposition party in Cameroon, the Social Democratie Front (SDP). See Le Messa-
ger, 30 November 2001, p. 6.
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common law. They were instead transferred to a prison in Bafoussam, a
town in Francophone Cameroon. The gendarmes told them: "You will be
judged in Bafoussam. You say you hate France and anything French, but
you have no choice." They were instantly and provocatively reminded of
their otherness in prison when the Francophone authorities told them that
"Anglophones can never receive the same treatment as Francophones, even
in heil" (Jua 2003: 103).
Unsurprisingly, stereotypes are commonplace in Cameroon to mark the
assumed differences in values and attitudes between Anglophones and Fran-
cophones. In an article on Francophone "Anglophobia", Ngome (1993: 28)
provided some striking examples of such Stereotyping:
"Anglophones see Francophones as fundamentally fraudulent, superficial and given
to bending rules: cheating of exams, jumping queues, rigging elections and so on...
The Francophones are irked by what they see as the Anglophone air of self-right-
eousness and intellectual superiority."
In his pamphlet The Path to Social Justice, Ngam Chia (1990: 2) stresses
the Francophone "neo-colonial" mentality that compares most unfavourably
with Anglophone independent-mindedness:
"The Francophone psycho-social background is neo-colonised and as such one must
not expect them to be as independent-minded as the Anglophones. For instance,
Anglophones see themselves as people who can live without depending on Britain
and France for aid, but the Francophones do not even believe that they can run a
simple administration in the civil service without the so-called expert direction from
France. To blame them, nevertheless, is to condemn the deep French cultural ali-
enation of Francophone Cameroon."
Anglophone leaders have made use of such stereotypes to rally the Ang-
lophone population behind them in their pursuit of autonomy, either in the
form of a return to the federal state or outright secession. For example,
the 1993 Buea Declaration tended to blame the "wicked" Francophones as
a whole for the plight of the "poor" Anglophones, and compared both in
rather idealised terms: the former, in füll solidarity, were seen to agree
among themselves about oppressing the latter who, by their very nature,
were considered peace-loving, open to dialogue, and committed to freedom
(All Anglophone Conference 1993: 29-30). Of course, such a demagogie
approach—which is commonplace in ethno-regional discourse—seems to
highlight the seemingly insurmountable gap between Anglophones and
Francophones that allegedly prevents both parties from living together
peacefully in the union. This approach may be efficiënt in mobilising Ang-
lophones but has hardly helped their struggles against their real enemy, the
Francophone-dominated unitary state that has allies and opponents in all
parts of the country. In addition, it tends to project a frozen and geographi-
cally restricted idea of being Anglophone, denies the existence of various
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ethnic links between Francophones and Anglophones, and creates serious
obstacles to any Francophone sympathy for the Anglophone cause (Konings
& Nyamnjoh 2003).
In this study, it has been argued that the entry of Anglophone nationalism
into the public space during political liberalisation has posed a major chal-
lenge to the post-colonial state's nation-building project. More than any-
thing else, it has questioned whether Cameroon has indeed progressed from
a state of national unity to one of national Integration (Biya 1987). Little
wonder that it has formed the start of a vehement collision course with the
government in power whose head, Paul Biya, has repeatedly remarked "Le
Cameroun sera uni ou ne sera pas" ("Cameroon is one and must remain
united").
One has, however, to be extremely careful when claiming that Anglo-
phone nationalism, which has been crucial to the course of democratisation
in Cameroon and has placed Anglophones at the centre of the political
debate, is a recent invention by some disgruntled Anglophone elites. Ample
evidence has instead been provided here to show that Anglophone national-
ism is, in fact, the result of a long process of Anglophone identity formation
and is currently feeding on the multiple grievances of Anglophones in the
post-reunification era.
Although Anglophone resistance has been a permanent feature of
Cameroon's post-colonial biography (Konings & Nyamnjoh 2003), it was
not until political liberalisation that the Anglophone elite started mobilising
and organising the regional population. Capitalising on traumatic Anglo-
phone experiences of "otherness" and second-class citizenship in the
Francophone-dominated post-colonial state, they began to lay claims to
autonomy and self-determination, in the form first of a return to a federal
state and later in the creation of an independent state. Confronted with
persistent government attempts to deconstruct Anglophone identity and to
suppress Anglophone Organisation, Anglophone nationalists have increas-
ingly resorted to less obtrusive forms of resistance, creating public space
for Anglophone identity and nationhood in the historical, artistic, virtual,
legal and everyday domains.
African Studies Centre, Leiden University.
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ABSTRACT
The article examines the historical process leading to the emergence of Anglophone
nationalism in public space during the current libéralisation process in Cameroon.
Anglophone nationalism poses a severe threat to the post-colonial state's nation-
building project that has been driven by the firm determination of the Francophone
political elite to dominate the Anglophone minority and to erase the cultural and
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institutional foundations of Anglophone identity. Persistent attempts by the Franco-
phone-dominated state to control the newly created Anglophone movements have
made Anglophone nationalists resort to less obtrusive forms of resistance, creating
public space for an Anglophone identity and nationhood in historical, artistic, virtual,
legal and everyday domains.
RESUMÉ
Occupation de l'espace public. Le nationalisme anglophone au Cameroun. — Cet
article examine Ie processus historique qui a abouti a l'émergence d'un nationalisme
anglophone dans l'espace public au cours du processus actuel de libéralisation au
Cameroun. Le nationalisme anglophone représente une sérieuse menace pour Ie pro-
jet de construction de la nation entrepris par l'État post-colonial, projet motivé par
la ferme résolution de l'élite politique francophone de dominer la minorité anglo-
phone et d'effacer les fondements culturels et institutionnels de l'identité anglophone.
Les tentatives récurrentes de l'État, dominé par des francophones, visant ä contröler
les mouvements anglophones récemment créés ont incité les nationalistes anglo-
phones a recourir a des formes de resistance moins ostentatoires en créant un espace
public pour une identité et un nationalisme anglophones dans les domaines histo-
rique, artistique, virtuel, legal et dans la vie de tous les jours.
Keywords//Vtofs-c/és: Cameroon, nation-building, Anglophone identity, Anglophone
nationalism, public space/Cameroun, construction de la nation, identité anglophone,
nationalisme anglophone, espace public.
